Jury Reform, Sentencing Process, and Housing Restructure-

By Nancy Rinehart

Introduction

I have a few very interesting theories (in my eyes) that I will present to you in the simplest form possible. I am not as highly educated as most who present studies such as these, nor do I think one needs to be, to see that there is a need for jury reform.

There are many ways that we could improve the current process of the jury system itself which I will be discussing further. Of course, the buck does not stop here, there are some major changes in sentencing process as well as the housing of convicted prisoners, especially those who are tried and convicted of capital offenses.

JURY REFORM

I. Technology

Jurors should be provided with all the latest technology in order to provide them with the tools needed in order to make an informed decision. Recorders so that they may playback any part of testimony they need to in order to refresh their memory. Video recording will gives an opportunity to examine body language of the defendant as well as, the witness. Headphones for all jurors would provide for clear and precisely heard testimony. I pads for note taking so that jurors can track ideas and thoughts in real time, and able them go back to the testimony recorded and then discuss the thoughts noted.

II. Duty

Citizens over the age of twenty one should be required to schedule their jury time each year. Perhaps in some type of organized program say alphabetically, A-J's pick one week out of the year that they will perform their duty. Whether they have knowledge of the case or an opinion should not matter. Jurors are expected to leave ideas and opinions at the door each day during the trial, if they can do that during trial what stops it is ridiculous to say that it can not be done prior.

III. Wages

Jurors should be paid for their time, including overtime. For example base their pay on their current rate of pay. If they are unemployed, than pay minimum wage. It is no wonder that these jurors are having such a hard time coming to an agreement. Some are sequestered, others have to pay travel expense.

IV. Daycare

If daycare is required for their children then there should either be a program or compensation provided for that as well.

V. Voire Dire

This process has really gotten so out of line it has became a game between teams of lawyers and judges. Jurors should not be subjected to such scrutiny. This process should either be eliminated or restructured to be implemented by a neutral third party that has no interest what so ever. It is uncalled for really except to confirm that the juror has the basic needs necessary to provide for his/her daily needs to be present mentally and physically and make an honest and fair decision. Look at the five hundred individuals that were questioned, and scrutinized for the George Zimmerman Trial. That in my mind was of no help. O.J. Simpson, Jodie Arias and worst of all recent cases to date Casey Anthony's everybody knows she was responsible for her child being dead. Did voire dire have any influence over these verdicts.

VI. Nonunanimous Verdicts

Should there be room for nonunanimous verdicts? 10-2 or 11-1 seems like it would make sense that there is always going to be somebody who does not agree. Human beings were created uniquely we are individuals, no two (well some twins and triplets etc.) created alike, yet we are expecting twelve to agree on the same issue. A very serious issue at that. While the constitutional issues involved with nonunanimous jury verdicts are of great importance, I do consider them beyond the scope of this paper.

SENTENCING RESTRUCTURE

Like I said I am keeping this simple. My main concern lies with capital crimes, hung juries, and inappropriate sentences due because of. Last semester I wrote a paper on the Jodie Arias Trial. So that is where it all began. As you will see I have mapped out an example of the Jodie Arias Trial Chart as it is today, and a Jodie Arias Trial Chart as it would appear if this sentencing restructure were in effect.

Basically what I propose is that there would be no more new trials. If the jury can not come to a unanimous decision, than the judge will be prepared to hand down his verdict. Unlike today, the "Death Penalty" would not be taken off the table, and, in addition there would be "Life on Death Row".

I. Sentencing Guidelines

Capital Crimes – Verdicts - Jury or Judge

Life with Parole

Life without Parole

Life on Death Row

Death Penalty

HOUSING RESTRUCTURE

Prisons have long been burdened with violence and overcrowding among many other issues. Criminals, murderers, are not afraid of their consequences. They are getting a slap on the wrist for the most horrific crimes, due to hung juries and the death penalty taken off the table. There needs to be a place between prison and Death Row or as I say verdicts that will make use of death row and make these criminals realize the stakes have just gotten a lot higher.

Have you seen the quarterly boxes prisoners are entitled to? The list of items they are allowed to receive include two pairs of blue jeans (can be Levi), sunglasses (can be Ray Bans) etc. They can have a T.V. sent to them from the store as well as books as long as they come from the store. This is not what I consider punishment for somebody who i.e. murdered a five year old girl by stuffing her face down into a toilet and forcefully holding her there until she took her last breath, after 2 years of abuse on a daily basis, such as sitting her bare behind on an electric burner. See State v. Lively, 11 So. 3d 65-La: Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2009 – Google Scholar.

There is a need for "Life on Death Row" where prisoners live just like the prisoners on death row. Only they do not have an expiration date. They get to live there for the rest of their life. Surely it would save our taxpayers money if these monsters were provided for in the same way as the death row inmates. Life in prison is to good for people like this.

JODIE ARIAS TRIAL.

Our government spends billions of dollars for the defense of criminals to insure they have a fair trial, only to have a jury system that fails. Take a look at the Jodie Arias case, it was on every news channel across the nation, she was on the stand testifying about her relationship with the victim, dragging his name and his body down the hall and through the blood all the way to the grave. Jodie Arias made a mockery of the system, who allowed her to appear on 48 hours, 20/20 and many personal interviews even on the eve of her jury deliberation and after. Further details are listed below. So far, to date the jury has hung on her sentencing and she is awaiting her new trial for the penalty phase. The victims' family sat in court every single day, traveled from afar, their careers suffered, their marriages suffered, their finances dwindled, yet they will be back until it is over. In the meantime Jodie Arias sells her copied art and is praised as a winner of the prison version of "American Idol" for singing "Oh Holy Night". She has had more news coverage in one year then the president himself. It is time to make some changes in regards to allowable verdicts or procedure after a "hung jury". No more new trials. It is time the victim's take back their rights.

China has an interesting system of jury reform that was approved in 2011

Quasi-juries would be good first step in judicial reform

The China Post news staff
July 29, 2011, 10:26 am TWN

After more than two decades since the idea was first proposed, Taiwan's Policy Council of the National Judicial Reform Tuesday approved the practice of a quasi-jury system in which citizen panels will be allowed advise judges in death penalty and life sentence cases. Under the proposal, the Judicial Yuan also has the power to expand the scope to controversial cases such as sexual crime trials.

The Judicial Yuan will begin drafting a bill on this policy. If both the Cabinet and the Legislature approve the bill, a three-year trial program of the system will be conducted in Chiayi District Court and Shilin District Court.

Under the proposed bill, citizens aged 23 or older and with at least a high school education would be chosen by lottery to sit on five-member panels alongside three judges for the trials. Panelists will deliberate the facts and provide their views to the judges. They can also question defendants or witnesses when allowed by the judges.

The panelists, however, will not participate in the ruling process. The right to determine the final ruling on the case will reside with the judges, who will have to specify the reason for not adopting the jurors' view when they rule in opposition to them.

If passed, the bill will no doubt mark a milestone in Taiwan's judicial reforms by opening courtrooms to the public. It also comes at a time when public confidence in the judicial system has been damaged by a string of corruption charges against judges and prosecutors as well as by a series of controversial sexual assault case rulings labeled by many as nonsensical and detached from reality.

According to the Central News Agency, the Judicial Yuan began mulling the possibility of letting citizens perform jury duties earlier this year, in part to win the public's trust in the judicial system. It held meetings with professors from Germany, Japan and Korea, who shared their countries' experiences in adopting the quasi-jury systems.

Nevertheless, the lack of open consultation and the fact that Taiwan would come short of adapting the “full” jury system similar to the UK and the U.S., allowing the jurors the right to rule and to cast deciding votes, has led to criticism from legal experts. Some call the reform nothing but “window dressing.” The so-called jurors, some critics suggested, are nothing more than a dignified audience with better seats in the courtroom. The China Times quoted an unnamed legal expert as saying that the jurors will not make much of a difference since lawyers will still focus on convincing the judge, since that's where the true power is.

There are reasons to be optimistic. While the jurors have no power to cast deciding votes, their mere presence in the courtroom and their ability to question defendants and witnesses will impact the legal process. The fact that judges are required to explain their rulings when they are in opposition to the jurors' opinions will create more transparent courts. The proposed bill is a prudent first step away from the old court system.

However, this is not to say the proposal is perfect. While first public responses focused on the jurors' rights, the more important question is how the current legal system will evolve to accommodate these jurors. For example, the bill should specifically demand that judges give an explanation of their rulings in layman's terms.

The bill should also specify whether chosen candidates are required to attend. The bill should make it clear that panel seats are rights as well as responsibilities.

More importantly, in its final form, the jury system should not be limited only to major trials. If the aim of the reform is to create a more open court and to train responsible judges, there is no reason why the juror system should stop at death or life sentence trials and leave all the other cases alone. Those cases may attract less media coverage, but comprise the majority of the judges' workloads.

Following in China's footsteps are:

|January 02, 2012

http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2011/07/29/311425/Quasi-juries-would.htm

France Experimenting with more "Jury" Trials

Following in the steps of countries like South Korea, Japan and Georgia, France is testing a pilot program to increase lay participation in criminal trials. However, unlike other countries that have recently embraced the jury system, France wants greater citizen participation because the current government believes it will depoliticize the trial process and lead to more guilty verdicts.

According to the article below,

Citizen panels are only used in trials at Cours d'Assises – higher courts that deal with serious crimes such as murder – where nine jurors assist three investigating judges (12 in appeals cases).

In the experiment due to begin this month in Tribunaux Correctionels (correctional courts) in Toulouse and Dijon, two jurors will sit with three magistrates in cases punishable by five to ten years of jail and involving crimes against the person (such as sexual assault and aggravated burglary).

If the trial proves successful, it will be rolled out to all Tribunaux Correctionels in 2014, as well as to courts that oversee the application of sentences.

Affecting some 40,000 cases a year, the changes will cost the French taxpayer 50 million euros a year, while many in the legal system believe the courts are already chronically underfunded.

*Announcing the introduction of juries in September 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "justice is handed down in the name of the French people, and so it should be handed down by the French people."*http://juries.typepad.com/juries/international-juries/page/2/

The Elimination of Hung Juries: Retrials and
Nonunanimous Verdicts
William S. Neilson a,*; Harold Winter b

http://web.utk.edu/~wneilson/IRLE-March-2005.pdf

Following are five cases related to hung juries. The first and the last cases are horrific crimes. The first case, I feel the punishment did not fit the crime, and, the last has yet to be sentenced due to a hung jury and awaiting a new trial in the penalty phase.

IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

In re of: State v. Lively

Following a five-day trial which commenced on October 19, 2007, a jury found the Defendant guilty of first degree murder. During the penalty phase, the trial court declared a hung jury. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced on January 29, 2008, to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

A motion for appeal was filed and granted on January 29, 2008. The Defendant is now before this court asserting one assignment of error. Therein, the Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.

Conclusion: Conviction was upheld.

State v. Lively, 11 So. 3d 65-La: Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2009 – Google Scholar

Code of criminal procedure in the State of Louisiana

CCRP 905.6

Art. 905.6. Jury; unanimous determination

A sentence of death shall be imposed only upon a unanimous determination of the jury. If the jury unanimously finds the sentence of death inappropriate, it shall render a determination of a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

Added by Acts 1976, No. 694, §1; Acts 1988, No. 779, §1, eff. July 18, 1988.

Cite: http://www.legis.state.la.us/lss/lss.asp?doc=112912

ANALYSIS

The defendant, Marilyn Roman Lively, was convicted of the first degree murder of five year old Jermasha Decuir. Jermasha had lived with the defendant since she was two and a half years old. At the time of her death, the only external area of her body that did not show evidence of injury was the genital region. Dr. Garcia testified that Jermasha had recent bruising to the forehead and scalp. There were lacerations to the front and back of the head, which were the result of blunt force trauma, that were in the process of healing. She also had linear marks on the buttocks that were consistent with a grill from an electric stove. The injuries to the buttocks were healing and were less than thirty days old. Jermasha also had burn injuries to both her hands. These injuries occurred prior to the time of death and were consistent with the hands being forced into and held in hot liquid. The injuries were in the process of healing.

Dr. Garcia further testified that Jermasha had bruising and a laceration to the soft portion of the upper lip. The left front middle tooth was missing as a result of that injury. However, there was no injury to the outer portion of the lip. Dr. Garcia testified that this indicated the front of Jermashas' face, especially around the upper jaw, had been forcefully pushed against a hard object. As a result of trying to move away from the object, Jermasha cut the inside portion of her lip on the tooth. Dr. Garcia testified that these injuries occurred at the time of death.

During testimony it was learned that the defendant was beaten on a daily basis. Her hands were put in boiling liquids, hot pots of meat, she was sat on hot electric burners, and then finally she was stuffed into a toilet face first and held there until she could fight no more, which is where she died. Why this jury did not find the death penalty to be in order we will never know.

The Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. First degree murder is the killing of a human being "[w]hen the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is under the age of twelve[.]" La.R.S. 14:30(A)(5). "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La.R.S. 14:10(1). Child abuse as heinous as this, that evolves into first degree murder is reprehensible. An innocent child, one who is under the age of five who suffered at the hands of this monster for more than half of her life, is helpless beyond belief. What this defendant deserved was the death penalty, yet because the jury was hung, the system, the procedure of sentencing when there is a hung jury, gave her life in prison without parole. This is a slap on the wrist, not to mention a slap on the face of our justice system.

IN THE STATE OF INDIANA

In re of: State v. Holmes

This appeal is from a judgment granting in part and denying in part the post-conviction relief sought by Eric D. Holmes. He was convicted of two counts of murder[1] for the intentional killing of Charles Ervin and Theresa Blosl, one count of attempted murder,[2] one count of robbery,[3] and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery.[4] The jury could not reach a unanimous recommendation for or against the death penalty. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death for the intentional murder of Theresa Blosl and imposed sentences for terms of years on the other counts. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the defendant's conspiracy conviction and his sentence for class A felony robbery, ordered that a sentence for class C felony robbery instead be imposed, and affirmed the imposition of the death sentence and the other convictions and sentences. Holmes v. State,671 N.E.2d 841 (Ind.1996), *reh'g denied,* (1997), *cert. denied,* 522 U.S. 849, 118 S.Ct. 137, 139 L.Ed.2d 85 (1997). In the subsequent post-conviction proceeding, the post-conviction court partially granted the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief, vacating the death sentence for prosecutorial 168*168 misconduct and ordering a remand to the trial court for a new penalty phase trial, but otherwise denied his petition. The State appeals from the post-

conviction court's partial grant of post-conviction relief and the defendant cross-appeals from the post-conviction court's partial denial of post-conviction relief. Finding error on an issue of law, we reverse the partial grant of post-conviction relief and hold that the defendant's petition for post-conviction relief should be denied.

Conclusion:

We reverse and vacate that portion of the post-conviction court's order setting aside the death sentence and ordering a new penalty phase and sentencing hearing, and we affirm the remaining portion of the order denying relief. The defendant's petition for post-conviction relief is denied.

Cite: State v. Holmes, 728 NE 2d 164 – Ind: Supreme Court 2000 – Google Scholar

Indiana Code 35-50-2-9

IC 35-50-2-9 Death Sentence (As of April 1, 2008)
(Trial Procedures; Aggravating/Mitigating Circumstances; Appeals)
Summary: Murder is the only crime for which a death sentence may be imposed. At the discretion of the Prosecuting Attorney, the State may seek a death sentence by allegations on a separate page of the Indictment or Information. Upon request of the defendant, it is required that the jury be sequestered (not separated even at night) during the trial. A bifurcated (two-stage) hearing is required. In the first stage, the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the charge of murder is determined. If found guilty, the same jury reconvenes for the second (sentencing) phase of the trial. The State must allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 of 16 aggravating circumstances listed in the statute. The most common is intentional murder while committing another serious felony. Mitigating Circumstances can also be raised. While not limited by statute, they often include the young age of the defendant, the lack of a prior criminal record, and mental illness. All evidence presented at the first phase of the trial may be considered. The jury of 12 is given 3 verdicts to choose from: death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, or neither. Any verdict must be unanimous. Any verdict is binding and the trial judge must sentence in accordance with the verdict. The jury is advised as to the statutory penalties for murder and any available good time credit or clemency. If the jury cannot reach a unanimous verdict, the trial Judge alone shall determine the sentence. In order to return a verdict for the death penalty or life without parole, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, and that any mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance(s). If neither, the defendant is sentenced to a determinate term of between 45 and 65 years of imprisonment. The trial Judge may receive victim impact evidence at sentencing. There is an automatic expedited appeal of a death sentence to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Cite: http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/dplaw.htm

ANALYSIS

Holmes got into an argument with his fellow worker Amy Foshee and was fired from his job at a Shoney's restaurant where he had worked for at least three months. At the time of closing that day, Charles Ervin, a manager, Theresa Blosl, a manager, and Amy Foshee, a worker, were leaving the restaurant. Ervin was carrying the till. Holmes, then 21 years of age, and Michael Vance a current employee, who had just been rehired that day, trapped the three in the foyer, Holmes preventing them from going outside and Michael Vance preventing them from going back inside. Holmes and Vance attacked the three and grabbed the till. The three were grabbed and stabbed multiple times. Ervin and Blosl died, but Foshee survived.

Another witness had overheard Holmes say, "I'm going to kill that bitch tonight." He also said he was going to spit on her glasses. This was a vendetta, against a place of employment and the co- workers whom Holmes blamed for his own faults. It was senseless and never should have happened. Holmes showed no remorse what so ever. When the police came to arrest Holmes, he was found with the victims' blood still on him, listening to loud music and dancing.

The sentence was just, two people were killed, if Holmes had it his way it would have been three. It was intentional Holmes stated "I'm going to kill that bitch tonight" and he did. This is what should be on the table for all criminals found guilty of capital murder in the first degree. Whether it be imposed by the unanimous jury or the presiding judge. The death penalty should not be taken off the table just because one or more jurors decide against the imposition it.

IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re of;

Commonwealth v. Boggs, No. 505-97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 13, 2003) p. 2-3.

On March 25, 1998, a jury convicted Petitioner of Murder in the First Degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). *See* N.T. 03/25/98, p. 1446. When the penalty phase of the trial resulted in a hung jury, the trial court pronounced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. N.T. 04/01/98, p. 2-4.

Petitioner timely appealed the judgment of sentence to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. **[*4]** *See Commonwealth v. Boggs,* 736 A.2d 678, No. 505-97 (Pa. Super Ct. January 14, 1999).[2] The state intermediate court affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence on January 14, 1999, *id;* and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied *allocatur* on July 9, 1999. *See Commonwealth v. Boggs,* 559 Pa. 712, 740 A.2d 1143, 146 MDA 1999 Order, p. 1 (Pa. 1999).

iii. Conclusion

Petitioner's claims are all procedurally defaulted or unmeritorious. Therefore, this habeas corpus Petition should be dismissed or denied in its entirety. Accordingly, I make the following:

Recommendation

AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2005, for the reasons contained in the preceding report, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's procedurally defaulted claim, Ground Four, of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DISMISSED, without an evidentiary hearing. The remaining claims, Grounds One, Two, and Three, should be DENIED, because they lack merit. Petitioner has neither demonstrated that any reasonable jurist could find this court's procedural **[*47]** ruling debatable, nor shown denial of any Constitutional right; hence, there is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability.

CAROL SANDRA MOORE WELLS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pennsylvania Code Title 42, Part VIII, Ch.97, Sec. 9711(a)

After a verdict of murder of the first degree is recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible. Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).
After the presentation of evidence, the court shall permit counsel to present argument for or against the sentence of death. The court shall then instruct the jury in accordance with subsection (c).
Failure of the jury to unanimously agree upon a sentence shall not impeach or in any way affect the guilty verdict previously recorded.

(b) Procedure in nonjury trials and guilty pleas.--If the defendant has waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the Commonwealth, in which case the trial judge shall hear the evidence and determine the penalty in the same manner as would a jury as provided in subsection (a).

(c) Instructions to jury.--

Before the jury retires to consider the sentencing verdict, the court shall instruct the jury on the following matters:

The aggravating circumstances specified in subsection (d) as to which there is some evidence.

The mitigating circumstances specified in subsection (e) as to which there is some evidence.

Aggravating circumstances must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases.

The court may, in its discretion; discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
The court shall instruct the jury that if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and at least one mitigating circumstance, it shall consider, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family. The court shall also instruct the jury on any other matter that may be just and proper under the circumstances.

http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=1433

IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re of: People v. Jeffery Dean Wash

Defendant Jeffrey Dean **Wash** was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189),[1] rape (§ 261, former subd. (2)) and robbery (§ 211) of Erin King, as well as the first degree murder and robbery of Shelly Siegel, and two counts of burglary (§ 459). The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that defendant committed the murder of Erin King during the course of rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(iii)), robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)), and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii)), and committed the murder of Shelly Siegel during the course of a robbery and burglary. With respect to the crimes against Erin King, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5), and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 1203.075). With respect to the crimes against Shelly Siegel, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. The jury also found that defendant personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of the burglaries.

When the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict, a mistrial was declared, a new jury was empanelled, and the issue of penalty was retried. The second jury returned a verdict of death. After denying defendant's motion for modification of the penalty verdict, the court imposed a sentence of death. This appeal is automatic. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; § 1239, subd. (b).)

Among the issues appealed was:

B. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES

1. *Double Jeopardy*

(14a) Defendant contends that state and federal principles of double jeopardy (Cal. Const., art I., § 15; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) barred the penalty phase retrial because the trial judge declared a mistrial of the first penalty trial without the requisite legal necessity. As explained below, the contention lacks merit.

(15) Discharging a jury without a verdict bars further prosecution unless the mistrial was granted for legal necessity or with the consent of the defendant. (*Curry* v.*Superior Court* (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 712 [87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345]; accord,***People*** v. *Compton* (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 59 [98 Cal. Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537]; *Stone*v. *Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 516 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809]; see also *United States* v. *DiFrancesco* (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130-131 [66 L.Ed.2d 328, 341-342, 101 S.Ct. 426].) "Such a legal necessity exists if, at the conclusion of such time as the court deems proper, it satisfactorily appears to the court that there is no reasonable 248*248 probability that the jury can resolve its differences and render a verdict. Under these circumstances the court may properly discharge the jury and reset for trial." (***People*** v. *Rojas* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 545-546 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357 [542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127]; see also §§ 1140, 1141.) The determination of the jurors' state of mind, and whether further deliberations will result in a unanimous verdict, lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge in view of all the circumstances. (*Stone* v. *Superior Court, supra,* 31 Cal.3d at p. 522; ***People*** v.*Rojas, supra,* 15 Cal.3d at p. 546.)

(14b) The original penalty phase jury commenced deliberations on a Monday and continued through the week. On Wednesday, the trial court received a note from the jury stating that although they unanimously agreed the aggravating outweighed the mitigating factors, they disagreed over the penalty. The note stated: "We are at an impasse over the appropriateness of a penalty. Some of us have strong subjective, personal feelings (convictions) that the death penalty is appropriate; others have equally strong feelings (convictions) for life without parole. For these reasons it is inconceivable [*sic*] that we will ever reach a unanimous decision." The note was signed by all 12 jurors.

The same day, Wednesday, the jury foreman sent another note to the court stating as follows: "For moral & personal reasons, and disagreement over the relative severity of the two penalties, we are deadlocked 7 to 5. [¶] Prospects for a unanimous verdict seem virtually non-existent." The trial court apparently failed to inform counsel of the existence of the notes.

On Friday, two days later, the foreman sent out three additional notes. Two were apparently received sometime that morning. The first stated: "We are *deadlocked*about 7 to 5." (Original italics.) The second reflected some movement, but reaffirmed the jury's view that it was deadlocked, stating: "We are in

disagreement (9 to 3). Prospects for a unanimous verdict are virtually nonexistent." Later that afternoon, the foreman sent the court a third note which stated as follows: "I feel that we gave it our best effort but are still in disagreement 9 to 3. [¶] There is no indication that movement is possible." A short time later, the court summoned the jury, acknowledged receipt of the three notes and, in the presence of counsel, questioned the foreman as follows: "Now, I have to ask you, I appreciate you have been deliberating for five days. Do you feel there is anything I can do in any way to help you in your deliberations, or have you reached a position where a verdict seems impossible?" The foreman responded: "I truly feel that we have reached a position where a verdict is impossible." The court then asked if there was any member of the jury who disagreed with the foreman. None indicated disagreement. Accordingly, the court declared a mistrial without objection.

249*249 Shortly after the case was set for retrial, it was discovered that the trial judge (Judge Golde) had engaged in ex parte communications with the jury during their penalty phase deliberations. Defendant, in response, filed a motion to dismiss the pending retrial on double jeopardy grounds. A hearing on the motion was held before Judge Wolters. One of the jurors from the first trial testified that Judge Golde had entered the jury room with neither counsel nor defendant present on two separate occasions during the penalty phase deliberations. During the first visit, the judge was asked to define life imprisonment and to explain the consequences of a hung jury. In response to the latter question, the judge explained that a hung jury would result in a new penalty trial. The jury also asked how long the judge would normally allow a jury to deliberate. The juror did not recall the judge's response.

The trial court's second ex parte contact with the jury occurred on Thursday, one day after receipt of the initial notes indicating a deadlock. On this occasion the jury reiterated its inability to reach a verdict and inquired again as to how long they would be required to deliberate. The judge stated that he would declare a mistrial if the jurors were unable to reach a verdict by Friday, the following day.

As noted earlier, the jury informed the court on Friday that it remained deadlocked and the trial court declared a mistrial. In response to a question from the deputy district attorney, the foreman indicated that the final vote was nine to three in favor of the death penalty.

At the conclusion of the hearing on defendant's double jeopardy motion, Judge Wolters ruled that although Judge Golde had acted improperly in contacting the jury, he had not abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial. Judge Wolters noted that the jury had indicated "quite strongly that it was deadlocked" before Judge Golde's improper contacts. Judge Wolters also rejected defendant's contention that the promise to declare a mistrial if the jury remained deadlocked on Friday improperly encouraged the jury to remain deadlocked or caused it to cease deliberations. Rather than establishing a deadline, Judge Wolter's observed, Judge Golde's statement could "just as readily be interpreted as an extension of time that the Judge would leave the jury out to deliberate ... after it had effectively indicated that it could... in no way

reach a verdict...." Accordingly, Judge Wolters denied the motion to enter a plea of former jeopardy and dismiss the action.

Judge Wolter's ruling was correct. Although ex parte communications between court and jury are clearly improper and will not be condoned (***People*** v. *Hawthorne* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118]), the record does not substantiate defendant's claim that the trial court's 250*250 misconduct caused the deadlock or "derailed" the jury from its deliberative duties. On the third day of deliberations the jury sent a note informing the court that they were "at an impasse" and that it was "inconceivable" they would "ever reach a unanimous decision." This was followed by a second note stating, "Prospects for a unanimous verdict seem virtually non-existent." In light of these unequivocal statements, defendant's assertion that the court's subsequent ex parte communications improperly coerced a deadlock or encouraged the jury to cease deliberations is not credible. Indeed, the three notes on Friday indicate that the jury must have continued to deliberate; the first note stated that the vote was seven to five; the second and third notes described the vote as standing at nine to three. Clearly, the jury's reaffirmation at that point that the prospect of a unanimous verdict was "virtually nonexistent" and that no further "movement [was] possible" amply supports the trial court's finding that a unanimous verdict was not reasonably probable. (***People*** v. *Rojas, supra,* 15 Cal.3d at p. 545.) The discharge of the jury was therefore supported by legal necessity, and defendant was properly retried. (*Ibid.*; *Stone* v. *Superior Court, supra,* 31 Cal.3d at p. 522.)

CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed in its entirety.

People v. Wash, 861 P. 2d 1107 - Cal: Supreme Court 1993 – Google Scholar

California Penal Code

The Elimination of Hung Juries: Retrials and Nonunanimous Verdicts

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Abstract
Relaxing the unanimity requirement for verdicts in a given criminal trial leads to fewer hung juries and more verdicts of all four types: correct and wrongful convictions, and correct and wrongful acquittals. Acriminal proceeding, however, does not necessarily end when a jury hangs.We demonstrate that if retrials occur until a verdict is reached, a unanimous verdict rule is generally more accurate than a nonunanimous rule with respect to the probabilities of all four types of verdicts. Thus, a tradeoff between hung jury costs and verdict accuracy exists when considering unanimous versus nonunanimous verdict rules.

JEL classification: K4
Keywords: Juries; Criminal law; Hung juries; Nonunanimous verdicts; Reasonable doubt

1. Introduction

An often-discussed concern of the criminal justice system is the frequency of mistrials due to hung juries. In their classic study *The American Jury*, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found a hung jury rate of 5.5% in their sample of over 3500 criminal trials. Since then, there have been few studies to add to our knowledge of hung jury rates. Two other studies of hung jury rates in California, one conducted in 1975, the other in 1995, found hung jury rates in different counties to often exceed 10% and sometimes

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20%.[1] Hannaford et al. (1999) compiled a data set of hung jury rates across federal and state courts. Their findings placed federal criminal hung jury rates between 2% and 3% over the period 1980–1997. They also examined hung jury rates in several large urban state courts, finding an average rate of approximately 6%. Given that there were 13,173 criminal jury trials in California state courts and 17,343 in Texas courts in fiscal year 2000–2001, for example, hung juries are a significant problem.[2] In this paper, we examine an often-discussed proposal for reducing the hung jury rate—nonunanimous jury verdicts.

Currently, two states (Louisiana and Oregon) allow for nonunanimous verdicts in many criminal trials. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of nonunanimous verdicts in two 1972 decisions.[3] In *Johnson v. Louisiana*, the Court ruled that having a minority of three jurors voting to acquit does not violate the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is interpreted as guaranteeing.**FN4** In *Apodaca v. Oregon*, the Court ruled that a nonunanimous verdict does not violate the right to a trial by jury specified by the Sixth Amendment.[5] In the aftermath of the Court's decisions, there has developed a vast legal literature debating the pros and cons of nonunanimous jury verdicts.

The leading argument in favor of nonunanimous verdicts is that they would reduce the hung jury rate.[6] If hung juries are often caused by lone jurors or a very small minority of jurors, moving from unanimous verdicts to a 9-3 rule, for example, would prevent the minority from blocking a verdict. Trial costs would be saved as fewer retrials would be needed.[7] Critics of nonunanimous verdicts argue that unanimity adds yet another level of protection for the innocent defendant, and the prevention of a wrongful conviction is a wellestablished goal of the legal system.[8] It is interesting that both sides of the debate often discuss the lone hold-out juror. Those in favor of nonunanimous verdicts argue that they eliminate the *flake factor*, that is, they prevent a single "irrational" juror from preventing a correct conviction. But those against nonunanimous verdicts argue that they may circumvent a single "rational" juror from preventing a wrongful conviction.[9] Thus, both supporters

1 See Flynn (1977) and Hannaford, Hans, and Munsterman (1999).
2 These numbers are from the *2002 Court Statistics Report* from the Judicial Council of California Administrative

Office of the Courts and the *Texas Judicial System 2001 Annual Report* from the Office of Court Administration
and the Texas Judicial Council.
3 While the constitutional issues involved with nonunanimous jury verdicts are of great importance, we consider
them beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of these issues, see Abramson (1994, chap. 5).
4 *Johnson v. Louisiana*, 92 S. Ct. 1620 (1972).
5 *Apodaca v. Oregon*, 92 S. Ct. 1628 (1972).
6 For supporters of nonunanimous jury verdicts, see Amar (1995), Glasser (1997), Morehead (1998), and Rosen
(1998).
7 Also, it is argued that many first trials will be prevented as defendants may be more willing to accept plea bargains since they will no longer be able to rely on the possibility that just one juror can hang the jury.
8 For critics of nonunanimous jury verdicts, see Kachmar (1996), Osher (1996), Saks (1997), Smith (1997), and
Klein and Klastorin (1999).
9 Another leading argument against nonunanimous verdicts, taken as beyond the scope of this paper, is that the
deliberation process will be seriously damaged. Minority viewpoints that may eventually sway other jurors will be
silenced if, once the necessary majority is reached, deliberations end. We do not model the deliberation process,
as each juror votes independently. For models of the deliberation process and strategic voting, see Klevorick

and critics of nonunanimous verdicts appear to agree that nonunanimity will increase the conviction rate. Supporters focus on the additional correct convictions, while critics focus on the additional wrongful convictions.

Our focus is on how nonunanimous rules affect the probabilities of *every* type of verdict—correct conviction, correct acquittal, wrongful conviction, and wrongful acquittal. Using a model developed in Neilson andWinter (2000) to examine the effect of peremptory challenges on jury verdicts, we demonstrate here that nonunanimous rules lead to more first trial verdicts—*both* convictions and acquittals.10 Thus, the first trial probability of each verdict type increases as the unanimity requirement is weakened. However, it is misleading to argue that nonunanimous verdicts reduce the hung jury rate. While this is true when considering the first trial only, it is not true when properly considering the effect of these rules on the *final disposition* of the trial. When retrials are taken into account, there ultimately is no such thing as a hung jury as every case reaches an eventual verdict.We demonstrate that when eventual verdicts are considered, a unanimous jury rule tends to lead to more accurate verdicts when compared to nonunanimous rules.

The model of criminal trials used in the remainder of the paper is introduced in the next section.11 Section 3 introduces the numerical example we use to facilitate the discussion of our results. Section 4 compares the verdict accuracy of unanimous and nonunanimous jury rules in the first trial and with retrials. Section 5 offers a thorough discussion of the robustness of our results to the numerical example. Section 6 compares our work to the strategic voting literature on nonunanimous verdicts. Finally, Section 7 offers some concluding comments.

2. Criminal trial model

In order to analyze the characteristics of different verdict procedures, we construct a simple model of a criminal trial. The model has the following key features: (i) evidence is presented to 12 jurors and each juror compares the evidence to a reasonable doubt standard; (ii) juror heterogeneity is binary; and (iii) a verdict is reached by the jury according to the verdict procedure under consideration.

and Rothschild (1979), Klevorick, Rothschild, andWinship (1984), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000), and Gerardi (2000).

10 While the models used here and in Neilson and Winter (2000) are similar, the uses of the model are quite different. Neilson and Winter (2000) analyzes the effects of peremptory challenges exclusively, and it does so assuming that hung trials are not resolved and by using an explicit social loss formulation. To allow for the *voir dire* process, juror heterogeneity takes the form of a bias that attorneys can recognize and use as a basis for peremptory challenges. The paper establishes that the peremptory challenge system can reduce social loss when challenges are awarded in a way that makes up for the overall bias of the population from which the jury is drawn.

In this paper, in contrast, juror heterogeneity does not take a form that can be exploited in voir dire, hung trials are resolved, and no explicit social loss formulation is employed. This more positive analysis is concerned with establishing the differences between various jury decision rules, and not jury selection.

11 The model of the criminal trial is incomplete in that it does not consider the deliberation process, and changing from a unanimous to a nonunanimous verdict rule might change the manner in which jurors deliberate. This issue is addressed explicitly in Neilson and Winter (2002), and is also considered in the strategic voting literature on jury verdicts, as discussed in Section 6.

Fig. 1. The distribution of the evidence.

2.1. Evidence and reasonable doubt

A trial consists of evidence for a defendant who is either guilty or innocent. The defendant is guilty with probability $P(G)$ and is innocent with probability $1-P(G)$. The evidence against the defendant is of strength s, with stronger evidence associated with a higher probability of guilt. Operationally, we assume that there are two probability density functions, $f(s|I)$ and $f(s|G)$, with s drawn randomly from $f(s|I)$ when the defendant is innocent and drawn randomly from $f(s|G)$ when he is guilty. The two density functions are shown in Fig. 1.

As shown by the figure, a guilty defendant generates stronger evidence than does an innocent one. The figure also shows a strength of evidence sI such that it is impossible for an innocent defendant to generate evidence of strength $s \geq sI$. Thus, if the evidence is of strength $s \geq sI$, the defendant must be guilty with probability one. This leads to our *reasonable doubt standard*: the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt according to

the evidence if and only if $s \geq sI$.12

12 Put another way, we adopt as a reasonable doubt standard the condition that Prob{$G|s$} = 1. A less stringent standard would not alter our qualitative results. Robustness is discussed in Section 5.

2.2. Juror heterogeneity

We assume that in the jury room, juror heterogeneity exists in the form of differences in jurors' perceptions of the evidence. Juror heterogeneity is a *necessary* assumption.With homogeneous jurors, there would be no difference between any of the jury verdict rules we consider since all jurors would vote identically. The minimum amount of heterogeneity required for hung juries, which in turn require juror disagreement, is for jurors to perceive the evidence in two different ways. We assume that each juror has a probability π of receiving a strong signal of the evidence, ss, which is believed to be the true strength of evidence.13 (Stated another way, each juror has a probability $1-\pi$ of receiving a weak signal, sw < ss.) Thus, by allowing for binary heterogeneity, any number from zero to 12 of the jurors can end up with the strong signal.14 Also, by using the binomial probability distribution, it is a simple task to calculate the probability of having a certain number of the 12 jurors receive the strong signal.15

A key aspect of our model is that all trial outcomes are driven by the strength of the evidence against the defendant. No juror completely ignores the evidence, and the signal a juror receives is directly related to the true strength of the evidence by the equation ss = $s + x$ for the strong signal, and sw = $s-y$ for the weak signal, with $x, y \geq 0$. A juror who receives the strong signal votes to convict if ss ≥sI, or when $s \geq sI - x$ as in Fig. 1. Similarly, a juror who receives the weak signal votes to convict if sw ≥sI, or when $s \geq sI + y$, as in Fig. 1. According to this formulation, a juror who receives the strong signal is more likely to believe that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt than is a juror who receives the weak signal. Notice, however, that the stronger the true strength of the evidence, the stronger are *both* the strong and weak signals.16

2.3. Trial outcomes

If we consider a single trial and assume (for the time-being) a unanimous jury verdict rule, there are three possible trial outcomes: acquittal, conviction, and hung jury. An acquittal occurs if either the evidence is too weak to meet the perceived reasonable doubt standard for any juror regardless of his signal ($s < sI - x$), or if all jurors receive the weak signal and the evidence is still sufficiently weak ($s < sI + y$) as in Fig. 1. A conviction occurs if either the evidence is so strong that it exceeds the perceived reasonable doubt standard for any juror regardless of his signal ($s \geq sI + y$), or if all jurors receive the strong signal and the evidence is still sufficiently strong ($s \geq sI - x$), as in the figure. Thus, even with a unanimous

13 We are not concerned with how the twelve jurors who end up hearing the case were selected, but how the final jury members decide the case based on several different jury rules.

14 To be clear, π is not the proportion of jurors who end up receiving the strong signal. Instead, π is the probability that any given juror receives the strong signal.

15 For example, with $\pi = 0.8$, using the binary probability distribution, the probability of having all twelve jurors receive the strong signal is 0.0687. The probability of having exactly nine jurors receive the strong signal is 0.2362,

but the probability of having nine or more jurors receive the strong signal is 0.7946, etc.
16 In Section 5 we explore an alternative source of juror heterogeneity in which all jurors agree on the strength of
the evidence, perhaps because of deliberation, but potentially disagree about the reasonable doubt standard. The
alternative source of heterogeneity yields the exact same results as our base model.

verdict rule, a conviction (or acquittal) does not require all 12 jurors to receive the same signal of the evidence: it simply requires a sufficiently strong (or weak) true strength of evidence.

For a hung jury to occur, two things must happen: (i) there must be some jurors who receive the strong signal and some who receive the weak one and (ii) the true strength of the evidence must be "close" to the reasonable doubt standard, that is, s must lie in the hung jury range $[sI - x, sI + y]$. Obviously, if all 12 jurors end up receiving the same signal, there is no final heterogeneity that can lead to a hung jury. With final juror heterogeneity and the true strength of evidence in the hung jury range, jurors who receive the strong signal vote to convict and those who receive the weak signal vote to acquit, resulting in a mistrial. Thus, in our model, it is a combination of juror heterogeneity and the strength of the evidence that affects the probability of ending with a hung jury. For a given case, if all 12 jurors vote to convict or acquit, unanimous verdict rules yield the same outcome as nonunanimous rules. For the nonunanimous rules to matter, then, the question that must be answered is: what would be the outcome of cases that end with a hung jury under a unanimous verdict rule if a nonunanimous rule was applied instead?

In examining rules that may reduce the probability of a hung jury, we argue that it is important to distinguish between rules that reduce that probability primarily in the first trial, versus rules that reduce that probability through successive trials. Consider the first trial. Assuming that the true strength of the evidence and the value of π do not depend on the verdict rule being used, when the evidence is in the hung jury range, a unanimous rule leads to a verdict whenever all 12 jurors receive the same signal (be it strong or weak). With a nonunanimous rule, 9-3 for example, a verdict is reached if only nine or more jurors receive the same signal. Thus, a nonunanimous rule leads to a higher probability of a verdict being reached because it reduces the constraining impact of final juror heterogeneity. But as more verdicts are reached, what happens to verdict accuracy? We will demonstrate that, compared to a unanimous rule, a nonunanimous rule increases the probabilities of correct verdicts (convictions and acquittals) *and* wrongful verdicts (convictions and acquittals) in the first trial.

In considering retrials with a specific verdict rule, such as a unanimous rule, the key difference between trials is that for any prior probability of guilt the defendant is assumed to have in the first trial, the posterior probability of guilt, given a hung jury, increases with each successive trial. Note from Fig. 1 that a guilty defendant is more likely to generate evidence between $sI - x$ and $sI + y$ (the hung jury range) than is an innocent defendant. The dark shaded triangle is the probability that an innocent defendant generates evidence in the hung jury range. The shaded trapezoid, which contains the dark shaded triangle, shows the probability that a guilty defendant generates evidence in the hung jury range. The difference in the sizes of the two regions results from the reasonable doubt standard. For a jury to be hung, the evidence must be close to the reasonable doubt threshold, sI, and, by construction,

guilty defendants tend to generate stronger evidence than innocent ones, so evidence near the reasonable doubt threshold is much more likely to come from a guilty defendant. In each retrial, the increase in the probability of guilt will affect the probabilities of the four verdict types. We will demonstrate that a unanimous jury rule, with retrials, tends to be more accurate than nonunanimous rules.

3. First trial unanimous verdict: a numerical example

In order to explore the implications of relaxing the unanimity requirement in jury trials, it is necessary to discuss the benchmark of unanimous verdicts in the first trial. The first trial has five possible outcomes: the conviction of a guilty defendant (correct conviction), the acquittal of an innocent defendant (correct acquittal), the conviction of an innocent defendant (wrongful conviction), the acquittal of a guilty defendant (wrongful acquittal), and a hung jury. The probabilities of these five outcomes are illustrated using a numerical example.17We use a numerical example for several reasons. First, although some of our main results are independent of the probability that a given juror receives the strong signal,π, some results are not, and this is most easily demonstrated using graphs from the example. Second, when we compare the outcomes of unanimous verdicts to the outcomes of nonunanimous ones, the binomial distribution changes in discontinuous ways, making comparative statics derivatives impossible. Third, when retrials are considered, the probability of guilt in each trial changes in nontrivial ways, making simple mathematical characterizations impossible. Finally, as shown in Section 5, our results are robust to the parameter choices.

We choose parameters that yield conviction, acquittal, and hung jury rates that approximate reality. In particular, studies suggest that hung jury rates are between5%and 10%. Also, 82% of verdicts were convictions in California jury felony trials in fiscal year 2000–2001, and 69% of verdicts were convictions in Texas district and county courts in the same year, suggesting that the conviction rate could be in this range. To this end, we specify $P(G) = 0.8$, $sG = 0.4$, $sI = 0.6$, and $x = y = 0.05$. The strength of evidence hung jury range, then, is [0.55, 0.65]. The probability densities $f(s|I)$ and $f(s|G)$ are assumed to be linear with the specified horizontal intercepts. For unanimous verdicts, these parameter values lead to hung jury rates between 0% and 9% and conviction rates between 66% and 75%, roughly in line with the actual hung jury and conviction rates.

Fig. 2 shows the probabilities of the five possible outcomes of the first trial with unanimous verdicts (the curves labeled 12-0) as functions of π, the probability that a given juror receives the strong signal.18 Beginning with hung juries, notice that hung juries are most likely when π is in the range [0.25, 0.75]. When the probability of a juror receiving the strong signal is in this range, it is unlikely that all 12 jurors will receive the same signal. If there are some of both types of jurors, the jury hangs whenever the evidence is in the hung jury range.19 Also note that in our numerical example, the probability of a hung jury reaches a maximum at about 9% when $\pi = 0.5$.

In our example, the probability of wrongful conviction is very small—it is negligible until π rises above about 0.6, and it reaches a maximum at about 0.14% when the entire jury receives the strong signal with certainty ($\pi = 1$). A wrongful conviction occurs only

17 Two other models that simulate the jury process with numerical examples can be found in Schwartz and Schwartz (1992), and Thomas and Pollack (1992). These models are very different than ours, even though some
of the questions raised are the same. The most important difference is that our model assumes objective guilt or

innocence, which allows for the use of an objective reasonable doubt standard, while the other models do not
have objective guilt and innocence and so have endogenous reasonable doubt standards based on the views of a
majority of the population.
18 The other curves in Fig. 2 labeled 11-1, 9-3, and 7-5 will be discussed in the next section.
19 From Fig. 1, the evidence is outside the hung jury range in 91% of the cases, independent of the value of π.

Fig. 2. The outcome of the first trial.
when the entire jury receives the strong signal and an innocent defendant generates evidence $s \geq sI - x$. For our numerical example, the probability that an innocent defendant generates evidence in this range is 1/144, and the probability that a defendant is innocent is assumed to be 1/5, making the maximum probability of a wrongful conviction 1/720≈0.14%. The minimum probability of a wrongful conviction is zero.
In comparison to wrongful convictions, the probability of a wrongful acquittal is quite high, ranging from 5% to 14%. Wrongful acquittals can occur for two reasons, either by a

guilty defendant generating evidence so weak that no one votes to convict, or by a guilty defendant generating evidence near the reasonable doubt standard and all jurors receiving the weak signal. Regarding the former, the probability that a guilty defendant generates evidence $s \leq sI - x$ is 1/16, and the probability that the defendant is guilty is assumed to be 4/5, combining for a baseline wrongful acquittal probability of 5%. This number is independent of π because it arises from the evidence being too weak for *any* jury to convict.
The second type of wrongful acquittals is added to this one, which is why the wrongful acquittal probability is higher when π is low (i.e. when jurors tend to receive the weak signal). In all, the reasonable doubt standard does a good job of reducing the probability of a wrongful conviction, but at the cost of increasing the probability of a wrongful acquittal.
The right-hand panels of Fig. 2 show correct verdicts. Recall that $P(G) = 0.8$, so the probability of a correct conviction cannot exceed 0.8, and $P(I) = 0.2$, so the probability of a correct acquittal cannot exceed 0.2. Also remember that the minimum probability for wrongful acquittals is 5%, so the maximum attainable value for correct convictions is 0.75. Variations in the probabilities of correct verdicts are caused by variations in hung jury probabilities, because when fewer cases hang there are more verdicts, some of which are correct. When π is in an intermediate range, the hung jury probability is high. When π is in the upper range, the hung jury probability is lower, and these additional verdicts are mostly convictions because jurors tend to receive the strong signal. Since most defendants who generate evidence in the hung jury range are guilty, most of these new convictions are correct. Thus, the correct conviction probability rises when π is large. For low levels of π, in contrast, most of the new verdicts are acquittals, leading to an increase in the correct acquittal probability.
Since the primary purpose of this paper is to address the outcomes of trials that would hang under a unanimity rule, the hung juries are worth a second look. In particular, it is worthwhile to determine the probability that the defendant in a hung trial is guilty, because if the case is retried, this is the prior probability of guilt in the second trial. As already mentioned, for our numerical example, the probability that an innocent defendant generates

evidence in the hung jury range is 1/144. The probability that a guilty defendant generates evidence in the hung jury range is 1/9. So, a guilty defendant is 16 times more likely to generate evidence in the hung jury range than is an innocent one, and the lighter shaded region in Fig. 1 is 16 times larger than the darker shaded region. Furthermore, since the defendant is assumed to be guilty with probability 0.8, a random defendant is four times more likely to be guilty than to be innocent. Combining these establishes that a defendant in a hung trial is 64 times more likely to be guilty than to be innocent, yielding a probability of 1/65 of innocence and a probability of 64/65 of guilt.

The only difference between a retrial and the first trial is the initial probability of guilt. In the first trial, the probability of guilt is a parameter of the model, and is set to 0.8. For the second trial, the probability of guilt is determined from the probability that the defendant in a hung first trial is guilty, in this case 64/65. Because wrongful convictions must occur for innocent defendants, and the defendant is very unlikely to be innocent in a retrial, wrongful conviction probabilities are even lower in the retrial. On the other hand, wrongful acquittals occur for guilty defendants, and since almost all defendants in retrials are guilty, wrongful acquittals are more likely in retrials. Of course, so are correct convictions.

4. Eliminating hung juries

4.1. First trial nonunanimous verdicts

Now considering all the curves, Fig. 2 demonstrates the effects on the probabilities of interest of changing the unanimous verdict rule to several different nonunanimous rules.[20] One of the most common arguments in favor of nonunanimous rules is that they lower the probability of ending with a hung jury, and this is shown in the top panel of the figure. For all values of π, the probability of a hung jury continues to fall as we move from a unanimous verdict rule to 11-1, 9-3, and 7-5 rules. With a unanimous verdict rule, a hung jury occurs because the strength of the evidence is in the hung jury range and not all 12 jurors receive the same signal. As we weaken the unanimity requirement, the probability of having the appropriate number of jurors receive the same signal increases and, therefore, the probability of ending with a hung jury falls.With fewer hung juries there are more verdicts, and Fig. 2 shows that the probabilities of all four verdict types increase.

At extreme values of π, nonunanimous verdict rules quickly reduce the probability of a hung jury because of the increasing likelihood of having the appropriate number of jurors receive the same signal. The shapes of the four verdict curves can be explained in the following way: for high values of π, most of the new verdicts are convictions—correct and wrongful; for low values of π, most of the new verdicts are acquittals—correct and wrongful. As the unanimity requirement is weakened from 11-1 to 7-5, at middle values of π *both* types of verdicts occur more frequently.[21] Thus, the fewer jurors needed to reach a verdict in the first trial, the more verdicts there are–both correct and wrongful.

4.2. Retrials and eventual verdicts

In Fig. 3, the unanimous rule is once again compared to several nonunanimous rules in terms of the probabilities of the four types of verdicts. The difference between Figs. 2 and 3, however, is that in the latter figure it is assumed that a trial that ends in a hung jury is continuously retried until a verdict is eventually reached. Each eventual verdict curve is drawn assuming that whatever verdict rule is used in the first trial, the same rule is used in successive trials. As discussed in Section 2, the key element in our model with retrials is how the probability of guilt changes with each successive trial. For a jury to hang, the evidence must be in the hung jury range close to the reasonable doubt standard, and this evidence is

more likely to be generated by a guilty defendant than by an innocent one.22 This implies that in each successive retrial, the probability of guilt, given a previous hung jury, increases.

20 To avoid clutter, we do not graph the nonunanimous rules 10-2 and 8-4.

21 At middle values of π, moving from 11-1 to 7-5 increases the probability of having the appropriate number of jurors receive the *same* signal (be it strong or weak).

22 Because a trial that ends in a hung jury must have evidence in the range [$sI - x$, $sI + y$], it may be reasonable to consider a truncated distribution of the strength of evidence when considering a retrial. We, however, use the original distribution. After a case is litigated, both sides have new information about the trial strategies of their opponent. Thus, it is unclear how the strength of evidence in a retrial compares to the strength of evidence in the first trial. We did check the robustness of our results to using a truncated distribution of evidence for retrials. We found very little quantitative difference, and no qualitative difference, in our results.

Fig. 3. The eventual outcome after retrials.

As the probability of guilt increases, the probabilities of correct and wrongful verdicts are affected.

One other distinction between Figs. 2 and 3 can be made. In Fig. 2, as hung juries are reduced with nonunanimous verdicts, the probabilities of *all* four types of verdicts can increase. In Fig. 3, however, because all the curves represent eventual verdicts, there are no hung juries at all. Thus, if a rule increases the probability of a wrongful acquittal, it must exactly offset a reduction in the probability of a correct conviction. Likewise, if a rule increases the probability of a wrongful conviction, it must exactly offset a reduction in the probability of a correct acquittal.23

Consider first the effects of reducing the unanimity requirement on the probabilities of wrongful convictions and correct acquittals (i.e. the final verdict for an innocent defendant). The nonunanimous rules, especially for high values of π, lead to higher probabilities of wrongful convictions and, therefore, lower probabilities of correct acquittals compared to the unanimous rule. In the first trial, weakening the unanimity requirement leads to more convictions that would have been hung under the unanimous rule. Even though a guilty defendant is more likely to generate evidence in the hung jury range, the unanimous rule

23 The probabilities of wrongful acquittals and correct convictions offset each other because they both involve a guilty defendant. The probabilities of wrongful convictions and correct acquittals offset each other because they both involve an innocent defendant.

in effect protects the rare innocent defendant by creating the need for a retrial. And in the retrial, conditional on the defendant being innocent, it is very likely that he will be acquitted.24 Thus, compared to nonunanimous rules, the unanimous rule with retrials leads to more accurate verdicts for the innocent defendant.

Now consider the effects of reducing the unanimity requirement on the probabilities of wrongful acquittals and correct convictions (i.e. the final verdict for a guilty defendant).

For high values of π, nonunanimous rules, especially the 7-5 rule, lead to slightly lower probabilities of wrongful acquittals and, therefore, slightly higher probabilities of correct convictions.Whenπ is high, the nonunanimous rules lead to more convictions in the first trial compared to the unanimous rule when the evidence is in the hung jury range.With a guilty defendant, therefore, the nonunanimous rules lead to more accurate verdicts. Eventually, the unanimous rule is also likely to lead to conviction, but with each successive retrial, there is a chance that a guilty defendant will be acquitted because the new evidence draw may be too weak. The nonunanimous rules do better in this case because they are likelier to convict in an earlier trial.

For moderate and low values of π, however, the nonunanimous rules do worse than the unanimous rule in terms of wrongful acquittals and correct convictions. When π is low, nonunanimous rules are likely to lead to an acquittal when the evidence is in the hung jury range, but a unanimous rule is likely to lead to a hung jury.With retrials, the unanimous rule has the ability to correctly convict a guilty defendant in a future trial because of the high probability of drawing sufficiently strong evidence in the retrial. In a sense, a unanimous rule is more patient with guilty defendants over a wide range of π. Also notice from Fig. 3 that while the nonunanimous rules do slightly better in terms of wrongful acquittals for high values of π, a unanimous rule can do substantially better for moderate and (especially) low values of π.

Taken as a whole, Fig. 3 demonstrates that a unanimous verdict rule tends to lead to more accurate verdicts than does a nonunanimous rule. At their best, for high values of π, nonunanimous rules lead to slightly lower probabilities of wrongful acquittals, but there is a tradeoff: in that same range of π, the lower probabilities of wrongful acquittals are offset by higher probabilities of wrongful convictions. Conversely, the moderate to lowranges of π do not involve the same sort of tradeoff. When the nonunanimous rules substantially increase the probabilities of wrongful acquittals, there is no offsetting reduction in the probabilities of wrongful convictions. Compared to a unanimous rule, the nonunanimous rules do no better, and often worse, in terms of wrongful convictions.

Other than the slight decrease in the probability of wrongful acquittals, perhaps the best argument that can be made in favor of nonunanimous verdicts is that they lead to more first trial verdicts, and (on average) to quicker verdicts in retrials.25 To the extent that hung juries are costly, nonunanimous rules do lead to a reduction in that cost. Our model suggests,

24 In a retrial, the innocent defendant is very likely to generate evidence below the hung jury range.

25 The expected number of trials until a verdict is reached yielded by each verdict rule depends on the value of
π.With π = 0.5 the probability of a hung jury is maximized. In this case, with a 12-0 unanimous rule the expected
number of trials is approximately 1.1, and for a 9-3 nonunanimous rule, for example, it is approximately 1.08. At
more extreme values of π, such as 0.25 (or 0.75), the expected number of trials for a 12-0 rule is still approximately
1.1, but for a 9-3 rule it is approximately 1.03.

however, that the savings in hung jury costs should be weighed against the costs of generally less accurate verdicts.

5. Robustness of the results

Since much of our analysis relies on a numerical example, it is important to explore its

robustness to changes in the underlying assumptions. The model we use has six parameters: the prior probability of guilt $P(G)$, the magnitude of the error for the strong signal x, the magnitude of the error for the weak signal y, the endpoints of the two evidence distributions sI and sG, and the placement of the reasonable doubt standard. The example assumes $P(G) = 0.8$, $x = y = 0.05$, $sI = 0.6$, $sG = 0.4$, and the reasonable doubt standard is sI. The basic result of the paper is the comparison between the unanimous verdict rule and the different nonunanimous rules. To demonstrate the robustness of the example to the parameter choices, we must show that the relative positions of the various curves in Fig. 3 are unaffected by parameter changes.

To do this it is expedient to characterize the incorrect verdicts from a single trial mathematically. To that end, let $F(s|I)$ and $F(s|G)$ be the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to the densities $f(s|I)$ and $f(s|G)$, respectively, and let $B(m, n, \pi)$ be the binomial probability of drawing at least m successes from a sample of n when the probability of a success is π. The probability of a wrongful conviction in a single trial when the majority requirement is m is

$$P(\text{WC},m) = P(I)[F(sI\,|I) - F(sI - x|I)]B(m, n, \pi). \quad (1)$$

More to the point, $P(\text{WC},m)/P(\text{WC}, n) = B(m, n, \pi)/B(n, n, \pi)$, which is independent of the parameters of the model. So, if a nonunanimous rule yields more wrongful convictions for some parameter values, it does so for all parameter values.

Similarly, the probability of a wrongful acquittal in a single trial when the majority requirement is m is

$$P(\text{WA},m) = P(G)F(sI - x|G) + P(G)[F(sI + y|G) - F(sI - x|G)]B(m, n, 1 - \pi). \quad (2)$$

The first term is the probability of a wrongful acquittal from the evidence being below the hung jury range, and the second is the probability from the evidence being in the hung jury range and enough jurors drawing the weak signal. Changing the majority requirement impacts only the second term. And, once again, the second term is larger for $m < n$ than it is for $m = n$ for all parameter values.

Before exploring the effects of changes in the parameter values, it is worth noting that Eqs. (1) and (2) could arise from a different model of the jury process. Suppose that all jurors agree on the strength of the evidence, perhaps as a result of deliberation, but that they may disagree about the reasonable doubt standard. More concretely, suppose that a fraction π of the jury pool has a low reasonable doubt standard, $sI - x$, and is therefore more prone to convict the defendant, and the remaining fraction $1-\pi$ has a high reasonable doubt standard, $sI + y$, and is thus more prone to acquit. Letting $F(s|I)$ and $F(s|G)$ be the distributions of

Fig. 4. Robustness of eventual trial outcome to parameter changes.

the evidence generated by an innocent defendant and by a guilty defendant, respectively, the formulas for the probabilities of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals are once again given by Eqs. (1) and (2).

It remains to show that the comparisons between unanimous and nonunanimous verdict rules in the original numerical example are robust to parameter changes when hung cases are retried. Fig. 4 illustrates the effects of changing the magnitudes of the signal errors. The graphs in the left column show the effects on the wrongful acquittal probabilities, comparing a unanimous verdict rule to a 9-3 majority rule, and those in the right column showthe effects on the wrongful conviction probabilities.26 The top rowshows the effects of lowering y without changing x, and the bottom row shows the effects of reducing x without

changing *y*.
In the top row of graphs, only the magnitude of the weak signal error is changed. This leads to no change in the probability of a wrongful conviction, because wrongful convictions require that jurors receive the strong signal, not the weak one. Reducing *y* means that jurors receiving the weak signal vote to acquit over a smaller range of evidence (as can be seen with the aid of Fig. 1), which reduces the probability of a wrongful acquittal. In the bottom row of graphs, only *x* changes. Reducing *x* makes the strong signal weaker, and reduces the range of evidence over which a juror receiving the strong signal votes to convict. Because
26 Fig. 4 excludes the graphs for correct acquittals and correct convictions.

of this, convictions become less likely and acquittals become more likely, both correct ones and incorrect ones. Accordingly, the wrongful conviction curves fall when *x* is reduced and the wrongful acquittal curves rise.
What is important for establishing the robustness of the numerical example, though, is how the relative positions of the unanimous-rule and nonunanimous-rule curves change when the parameters change. Fig. 4 shows that even though changing the parameters can change the position and scale of the pairs of curves, it does not change the relative positions. So, changing *x* and *y* does not change the fact that the unanimous rule outperforms the nonunanimous rules in wrongful convictions for the entire range of π and also in wrongful acquittals for the moderate to lower range of π in which the weak signal, and therefore wrongful acquittals, are likely to be prevalent.
As for the prior probability of guilt, raising $P(G)$ reduces the probability of wrongful convictions because a defendant must be innocent to be wrongfully convicted, but it increases the probability of wrongful acquittals because defendants are more likely to be guilty. It also increases the probability of a hung jury in the first trial because guilty defendants are more likely to generate evidence in the hung jury range. Still, even though changing the prior probability of guilt changes all of the curves, it does not change the relative positions of the unanimous and nonunanimous curves, so it does not affect our conclusions.
For the remaining parameters of interest, changing *sI*, *sG*, or the reasonable doubt standard all have two effects. First, they change the probability with which a guilty defendant generates evidence below the hung jury range, so they change the minimum probability of wrongful acquittals. Second, they change the probability of guilt conditional on the evidence being in the hung jury range, which also changes the mixture of wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals. However, the relative positions of the unanimous and nonunanimous wrongful conviction curves, and the relative positions of the unanimous and nonunanimous wrongful acquittal curves, do not change, and so our results continue to hold.27

6. A comparison with the strategic voting literature

Our primary result, that when all hung cases are retried unanimous verdicts generally provide more accuracy than nonunanimous ones, contrasts sharply with Feddersen and Pesendorfer's (1998) results from their analysis of strategic voting. In their analysis, weaker majority requirements outperform stronger ones, with unanimous verdicts performingworst of all. To understand why the results differ, we must first explain their model in some detail. They assume that there are 12 jurors, each of whom receive a signal of the defendant's guilt or innocence, with guilty defendants most likely to generate signals of guilt and innocent
27 Another robustness check involves not the parameters, but the model itself. Instead of having two possible

signals, one stronger than the true evidence and one weaker, it is possible to consider a model that has a third type
of signal that is perfectly accurate. Doing so would, in general, increase the correct verdict probabilities, since
jurors receiving the accurate signal would always vote the correct way, and incorrect verdicts could only occur
when none of the jurors receive the correct signal. However, the comparison of the incorrect verdict probabilities
under the different voting rules remains unchanged, since they depend on the probabilities of jurors getting one
or the other of the incorrect signals.

defendants most likely to generate signals of innocence. Jurors then vote simultaneously without knowing the other jurors's signals, and the defendant is convicted if and only if a majority k of the jurors vote to convict. In other words, if the defendant is not convicted he is acquitted, and there are no hung juries. Since jurors vote simultaneously, in Nash equilibrium they should vote under the assumption that their votes are pivotal; i.e. they should vote as if $k-1$ other jurors are voting to convict, so that an additional vote to convict results in a conviction, and another vote to acquit results in an acquittal. This works because if the voter is wrong about being pivotal, his assumption that he is pivotal has no impact on the verdict.

When jurors assume they are pivotal, it gives them a strong predisposition to vote to convict no matter what the signal is, especially under unanimity. When there are 12 jurors, a juror is pivotal only if all eleven other jurors vote to convict. If all of them received the guilty signal, it makes it very likely that the defendant was guilty, and these eleven guilty signals may outweigh the juror's own signal. Of course, if he receives a guilty signal himself, he will vote to convict, but if he receives an innocent signal he may still vote to convict.

Feddersen and Pesendorfer restrict attention to circumstances under which jurors' strategies are responsive, that is, the juror's voting rule depends on the signal he receives, and they also restrict attention to circumstances under which sincere voting is not a Nash equilibrium. Both of these are restrictions on their reasonable doubt standard. Since voting cannot be sincere, and since all jurors receiving the guilty signal vote to convict, jurors receiving the innocent signal can neither always vote to convict (which would make the strategy unresponsive) nor always vote to acquit (which would make the strategy sincere). So, they must employ a mixed strategy.

For a juror receiving the innocent signal to use a mixed strategy, he must be indifferent between voting to convict and voting to acquit. For this to occur, it must be the case that as the number of votes required for conviction rises, so does the probability that a juror receiving the innocent signal votes to convict. Consequently, Feddersen and Pesendorfer get the result that as the majority requirement becomes stricter, jurors receiving the innocent signal are more likely to vote to convict. At the same time, as the majority requirement becomes stricter, the jury is less likely to contain enough jurors who have received the guilty signal. So, as the majority requirement becomes stricter, wrongful acquittal probabilities rise because of juror heterogeneity, and wrongful conviction probabilities also rise because jurors receiving the innocent signal are more likely to vote to convict.

Our model differs from their strategic voting model in two important ways. First, in our model jurors vote sincerely, not strategically. Second, a failure to convict does not

necessarily imply an acquittal. This matters because as Coughlan (2000) shows, when k jurors must vote to acquit for an acquittal to occur, Nash equilibrium implies sincere voting in a broad range of circumstances. To see why, when a majority of k is required for either a conviction or an acquittal, a juror can be pivotal in two ways: either $k-1$ other jurors are voting to convict, or $k-1$ jurors are voting to acquit. So, being pivotal does not provide very much information, and the juror votes according to his signal. In fact, Coughlan's analysis justifies our assumption of sincere voting. As we show, once voting is sincere, all that is left for governing wrongful verdict probabilities is juror heterogeneity and the probability of guilt across retrials, and our analysis shows that reducing the unanimity requirement generally reduces the accuracy of verdicts.

7. Concluding comments

In this paper,we develop a model of a criminal trial that identifies two main factors behind a trial ending in a hung jury. First, there must be juror heterogeneity to account for jurors not unanimously agreeing with each other. Second, the true strength of the evidence against the defendant must be "close" to the reasonable doubt standard. When the evidence is close to the reasonable doubt standard, jurors who receive the strong signal of evidence vote to convict the defendant, and those who receive the weak signal vote to acquit. With very strong evidence, all jurors, regardless of their heterogeneity, vote to convict the defendant; with very weak evidence, all jurors vote to acquit. Thus, all trial outcomes are driven by the strength of the evidence.

A nonunanimous verdict rule, by reducing the impact of juror heterogeneity, leads to more first trial verdicts than does a unanimous rule. However, we demonstrate that the nonunanimous rule leads to more of each of the four types of verdicts in the first trial—correct and wrongful convictions and correct and wrongful acquittals. As hung cases are retried, the main difference across trials is the defendant's probability of guilt. Because the strength of the evidence must be sufficiently high for a trial to hang, it is much more likely that a hung jury occurs for a guilty defendant than for an innocent one. Verdict accuracy, in turn, depends on the probability of guilt and the verdict rule used.

When allowing for eventual verdicts through repeated retrials, we identify one advantage in terms of verdict accuracy of a nonunanimous rule over a unanimous rule: a nonunanimous rule leads to a slightly lower probability of a wrongful acquittal when the probability of a juror receiving the strong signal of evidence, π, is sufficiently high. In this same range of π, however, a nonunanimous rule also leads to a higher probability of a wrongful conviction. For moderate to low values of π, a nonunanimous rule does no better than a unanimous rule in terms of wrongful convictions, but does much worse in terms of wrongful acquittals. In this range of π, many first trial acquittals with a nonunanimous rule are wrongful. Had these same cases hung under a unanimous rule, it is extremely likely there would have been a future correct conviction for the guilty defendant. While it is true that a nonunanimous rule can save on hung jury costs, it generally does so at the expense of less accurate verdicts.

One other factor that can be taken into account when considering a nonunanimous verdict rule is howsuch a rule may circumvent prosecutorial discretion. In our model, all hung juries are retried until a verdict is reached. In practice, however, a case that ends with a hung jury may be retried, dismissed, or reach its final disposition through a plea bargain.28 It is the prosecutor that plays the largest role in determining the final disposition of a case. To retry or dismiss a case after it has hung can be solely the prosecutor's decision, and a plea bargain at least requires his approval. If there is a case that a nonunanimous rule would resolve, yet

a unanimous rule would lead to a hung jury, the nonunanimous rule in effect replaces the discretion of the prosecutor in deciding how best to proceed.

28 In an exhaustive study of hung juries, Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott, and Munsterman (1999) present some evidence on post-hung jury dispositions. Using 453 hung jury cases between 1996 and 1998, they find that 31.8% of those cases were resolved by plea agreements, 21.6% were dismissed, 32.0% were retried as jury trials, 2.4% were retried as bench trials, and 12.2% had other dispositions.

To thoroughly deal with the tradeoffs involved between prosecutorial discretion and nonunanimous rules in dealing with hung juries, a social objective must be identified. Although beyond the scope of this paper, some brief comments can be made. It is unlikely that a criminal trial social loss function and a prosecutor's objective function are identical.29 Aprosecutor, by law, must only prosecute defendants believed to be guilty. Thus, a wrongful conviction to a prosecutor may be considered a personal victory, just as a correct acquittal may be considered a personal loss. As for hung jury costs, even though a prosecutor who retries a case does not bear the full costs of the retrial, budgetary constraints may impose hung jury costs on individual prosecutors. Finally, there may be little difference between prosecutorial discretion and a nonunanimous rule if the decision to retry or dismiss a case that has hung depends on the number of jurors who voted to convict in the initial trial.30 If, for example, the prosecutor is implicitly using his own decision rule that he retry every case that initially had at least a 9-3 majority to convict (if that information is attainable), and dismiss every case that initially had at least a 9-3 majority to acquit, replacing the unanimous rule with a 9-3 nonunanimous rule would have minimal effect on the final disposition of the case.

In all, because there is currently a mechanism that allows for discretion in dealing with hung juries, the desirability of a nonunanimous verdict rule is weakened. If the prosecutor's objective function diverges wildly from some social objective function, there may be a sound argument in limiting prosecutorial discretion. But even in this case, the ability of nonunanimous verdict rules to lead to accurate verdicts is in question. A tradeoff between hung jury costs and verdict accuracy exists when considering unanimous versus nonunanimous verdict rules.

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29 A common social objective in the economic literature on criminal trials is to minimize the expected wrongful verdict costs. See Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987), Schrag and Scotchmer (1994), Feddersen and Pesendorfer

(1998), and Coughlan (2000). Neilson andWinter (2000) also include an expected hung jury cost in the social loss
function. Also, for a complete discussion of the comparison between wrongful conviction and wrongful acquittal
costs, see Volokh (1997).
30 Flynn (1977, p. 134) briefly discusses some evidence on the relationship between the number of jurors initially
voting to convict and the final disposition of the case.

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.**FN4** In *Apodaca v. Oregon*, the Court ruled that a nonunanimous verdict does not violate the right to a trial by jury specified by the Sixth Amendment.

http://web.utk.edu/~wneilson/IRLE-March-2005.pdf

Apodaca v. Oregon

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that state juries may convict a defendant by less than unanimity even though federal law required that federal juries must reach criminal verdicts unanimously. The four-justice plurality opinion of the court, written by Justice White, affirmed the judgment of the Oregon Court of Appeals, and held that there was no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. Thus Oregon's law did not violate due process.

Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, argued that there was such a constitutional right in the Sixth Amendment, but that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not incorporate that right as applied to the states.

This case is part of a line of cases interpreting if and how the Sixth Amendment is applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for the purposes of incorporation doctrine, although the division of opinions prevented a clear-cut answer to that question in this case.

Arguing the case for the state of Oregon were Jacob Tanzer and Lee Johnson; both would later serve on the Oregon Court of Appeals.

Below is the Trial Chart for the Jodie Arias Case as it is today and an example what the Trial Chart would look like with the changes I am proposing.



STATE OF ARIZONA TRIAL CHART RE: STATE OF ARIZONA V. JOSIE ARIAS

EXAMPLE OF THE JODIE ARIAS TRIAL CHART
UNDER THE PROPOSED SENTENCING GUIDE