Juvenile Offender: A Victim of or A Menace to Society

By: Rosemary Leyson

Law 17 & 34

May 22, 2006

On March 2000, California voters passed Governor Pete Wilson sponsored initiative called the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act”. Among other claims, supporters said it would reduce and prevent juvenile crime. This law is focuses on punishment with no real meaningful solutions. Currently, there are no statistical evidence to support Proposition 21. Studies across the nation with similar laws show similar results. Political rhetoric and sensationalistic media spin on a few high profile cases have given the public misperceptions on juvenile crime rate. Over zealous and punitive desire to lock up and throw away the keys on violent juveniles have conveniently blurred the legal status of minors to adults without the full rights of an adult. 1

There are legal precedence that cognitive capacity between minors and adults are distinct and different. It needs to be argued that violation of constitutional rights of minors are at stake and trying juveniles as adults only exacerbate their victimization as a minor.

This article will examine legal jurisprudence in distinguishing a minor from an adult and its legal relevance in opposing the treatment of minors as adults in the context of criminal court proceedings. The first discussion will examine precedence for legal distinction of adults and minors. Second discussion will examine lack of judicial equity in representation, prosecution and sentencing of indigent minors.

I begin my first argument with a review of distinct legal definition of a minor versus adult. California Welfare and Institution Code Section 101(a): “Adult” means a person 18 years of age or older. In the same Section, subsection (b) states: “Child” or minor means a person under 18 years of age.2 California Family Code Section 3402(b) states: “Child” means an individual who has not yet attained 18 years of age.3

As a matter of law, legal distinction between adult and minor is clear. Every state provides legal difference between what a minor is legally allowed to do or act and that of an adult.

On the issue of due process and admissible confession in the case of In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), 4 U.S. Supreme Court understands the intrinsic difference between an adult and a child, and states confessions from children are not known to be trustworthy or reliable. Court further states a child maybe ignorant of their rights or give in to authority and what is expected of them to satisfy their short term need or desire. A child can easily be self-incriminating to please authority or be in fear of authority to easily be coerced into making self-incriminating statements. This violates the Fifth Amendment, the right to refrain from self-incrimination.

Legal distinction between adult and minor continues over juvenile death penalty issues. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), 5 Court ruled minors 16 and younger are prohibited from death penalty citing a violation of the Eight Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, limiting a state from imposing on a minor punishment of death as cruel and unusual punishment. Court acknowledges that although a minor may commit an adult crime such as murder, the lack of culpability of the minor still plays a factor in determining sentence that is different from an adult. Court acknowledges that the mind of a child lacks sufficient intelligence, maturity and education and is more prone to peer pressure and impulsive behavior with little or no regard for consequences.

In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), 6 Court prohibits execution of mentally retarded person due to diminished capacity, as cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment. Court states although mentally retarded person can distinguish right from wrong, a mentally retarded person can maintain diminished capacity and culpability to fully realize their actions and the consequences. Court continues that mentally retarded person do not make credible nor reliable witnesses and due to a lack of culpability from mental retardation, can give the court an impression that he lacks remorse or is indifferent to the crime he has allegedly committed.

In Roper v. Simmons, 112 S. W. 3d 397(2005) Court bans death penalty on crimes committed while under 18 years of age, holding it a violation of the Eight Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, that prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Court recognizes that age of 18 is the socially acceptable line between childhood and adulthood. Violent crimes committed by juveniles such as the one by Simmons, though vile and heinous, Court recognizes that an adolescent, like that of a mentally retarded adult is lacking a fully developed mind. Court further acknowledges that juveniles are “categorically less culpable than the average criminal”. A juvenile mind is one of immaturity, impulsive behavior, irresponsibility, and peer pressure associated with adolescence that contributes to a minor’s diminished capacity. Court in Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958), 8 considered the evolving standards of decency in a progressing society applies in prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons and minors.

Another challenge to treating juveniles as adults came as a direct challenge in Manduley v. Superior Court (People) (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 537 [ 33 Cal. Rptr.,2d. 10; 41 P. 3d. 3] 9. It stated that Proposition 21’s provision on automatic transfer of minor to criminal court is a violation of California State Constitution, Article III Section 3, 10 a provision that requires separation of powers. Court stated Proposition 21 is an unlimited piece of legislation that leaves too much room for arbitrary decisions. Arbitrary yet life changing decision that will make the difference between punishment or rehabilitation for young offenders. To bypass judicial review for consideration of juvenile in criminal court compromises the doctrine of shared power and threatens protection of due process for minor.

State statutes maintain a clear line of responsibility between adult and a minor. The age of 18 is the threshold to adulthood. This is evident in the level of privilege and access to various services and functions of society such as the right to vote, right to serve on a jury, the right to full time employment, the right to marry and the right to serve in the military, among others. It is legally reprehensible then, to claim a legally recognized juvenile as an adult solely for criminal court proceedings. It is judicial imperative that due process be followed and judicial review be mandatory for each and every juvenile accused of serious criminal conduct. Without diminishing the pain and suffering of victims to juvenile crime and concern for public safety, it is a poor precedence to bypass constitutional rights of all persons.

Our legal standard for the accused is innocent until proven guilty. It is unwise and a compromise to our own rule of law to change a minor to an adult just so prosecutors and politicians can fulfill some other agenda and slip undisciplined, special interest type of legislation like Proposition 21 unto the lap of mislead voters. Perhaps, if we as a society spent more time and as much money on the well being of minors instead of punishing minors after the fact, society would be better enriched.

Thus, I have shown, that there is legal precedence that cognitive capacity between minors and adults are distinct and different. Trying a juvenile as adult compromises judicial process.

FOOTNOTES

1. State of California California Budget Project Budget Brief January 2000, Proposition 21 THE GANG VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE PREVENTION ACT, http://www.cbp.org/2000/bb000101.htm

2. State of California Law California Welfare and Institution Code Section 101(a), subsection (b)

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=wic&group=00001-01000&file=100-109

3. State of California Law California Family Code Section 3402(b)

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=fam&group=03001-04000&file=3400-3412

4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=387&invol=1

5. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)

http://www2.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0487_0815_ZS.html

6. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)

http://www2.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-8452.ZS.html

7. Roper v. Simmons, 112 S. W. 3d 397 (2005)

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-633.ZS.html

8. Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958)

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0356_0086_ZS.html

9. Manduley v. Superior Court (People) (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 537 [ 33 Cal. Rptr.,2d. 10; 41 P. 3d. 3]

http://livepub.americanlegalnet.com/lpLive/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&vid=Cal&2.0

10. California State Constitution, Article III Section 3

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_3